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ABSTRACT: 
Social welfare funcitons for privafe goods economies 
with classical preferences are considered. It is shown that every 
social welfare function satisfying a weak nonimposition condition 
and the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom is of one 
of the following f orms. It is either null or the class of decisive 
coalitions is an ultrafilter or the class of anti-decisive 
coalitions is an ultrafilter. 
Introduction 
The relevance of Arrow's General .Possibility Theorem [l] 
to economics has been questioned on various grounds. The most telling 
of these criticisms is that most formulations of the theorem require 
a social welfare function to be defined for all conceivable profiles 
of individual preferences. Economists usually work with a much 
smaller class of preference relations. The set of alternatives is 
usually taken to be a set of distributions of commodities, and preferences 
are assumed to be selfish and possess some degree of various monotonocity, 
smoothness and convexity properties. Arrow [l] addressed the problem 
of the existence of social welfare functions for these domains, but 
his results were not satisfactory, as noted by Blau [2]. Recently 
Kalai, Muller and Satterthwaite [6] and Maskin [8] have proved versions 
of the General Possibility Theorem for certain economic domains. Kalai­
Muller-Satterthwaite prove that any soci:,�l welfare function satisfying the 
Pareto principle (i.e. , weakly Pareto superior distributions are also 
socially superior) and May's [9] version of the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA), whose domain is the set of all convex, continuous, 
strictly monotonic preferences over distributions of at least two 
public goods, must be dictatorial. Maskin deals with the case where 
all goods are private and preferences are selfish. He requires the 
social welfare function to satisfy a monotonicity condition which 
is stronger than IIA, and proves that the social welfare function 
must be dictatorial. 
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Both Kalai-Muller-Satterthwaite and Maskin assumed that the 
society was a finite set of individuals. Fishburn (4] gave an example to 
show that there exist nondictatorial social welfare functions satisfying the 
Pareto principle and IIA for infinite societies, Kirman and Sondermann 
[7] and Hansson [5] have characterized the class of decisive coalitions 
for such social welfare functions with an unrestricted domain as 
being ultrafilters, which reduces in the case of finite societies 
to being dictatorial. A third line of research was pursued by 
Wilson [10] who dropped the Pareto principle. The reason for being 
interested in this case is not so much that the Pareto principle is 
regarded as being unreasonably strong, but that by dropping it the 
strength of IIA and the group rationality requirements are made more 
apparent. Wilson's result is basically that a social welfare function 
with an unrestricted domain satisfying IIA and a very weak nonimposition 
condition is either null (i. e. , all alternatives are always socially 
indifferent) or dictatorial in one of two senses. The first sense is 
the usual one, i.e. , there is some individual such that the social 
preference always agrees with her preference. The second sense in 
which a social welfare function may be dictatorial is that there is 
some individual such that the social preference is the reverse of 
hers. Such a social welfare function may more properly be called 
antidictatorial. 
This paper unites these three strands of the theory by 
characterizing the decisive or antidecisive coalitions of social 
welfare functions which satisfy IIA and a nonimposition condition 
somewhat weaker than Wilson's and which have domains satisfying certain 
rather weak conditions which are satisfied by all the usual sets of 
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"classical" preferences on private goods. The result is that if there 
are at least two private goods and the social welfare function satisfies 
!IA and the weak nonimposition condition, then either it is null or 
either the collection of decisive or antidecisive coalitions is an 
ultrafilter. Adding the requirement that the Pareto principle be 
satisfied then forces the collection of decisive coalitions to be an 
ultrafilter. Hence for finite societies the social welfare function 
must be dictatorial. Since Maskin's monotonicity condition implies 
!IA and the Pareto principle implies the weak nonimposition condition 
used here, this result yields Maskin's as a special case. It also 
obtains the results of Wilson, Kirman and Sondermann, and Hansson 
in the case where the alternatives are conunodity distributions, but 
technically their results are not a special case of this one. The 
reason is that their results apply equally well to finite sets of 
alternatives, whereas the results here depend on the structure of the 
set of commodity distributions, Also, the techniques used here do not 
allow one to deduce the Kalai-Muller-Satterthwaite result for economies 
with only public goods as they involve constructing distributions in 
which different agents receive different consumptions. However, 
if one requires a social ordering to be able to rank infeasible alter-
natives of the sort where different agents are permitted different 
consumption of the public goods, then their result follows. 
Notation and Definitions 
1 Let R(A) denote the set of regular preferences on the set 
A. When the set A is understood from the context we may write simply 
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R. For any R E R, R denotes the asynunetric part of R and R denotes 
synunetric part of R.2 The statement xRy is interpreted to mean that 
subjectively, x is at least as good as y. xRy is interpreted to mean 
that x is strictly better than y, and xRy means that x and y are 
indifferent. For A' c A, RIA' is that preference in R(A') which 
agrees with R. (Viewing R as a subset of Ax A, then RIA' = 
Rf1 (A' x A')), 
A T-profile of preferences R is a mapping from T to R, i.e. 
R E RT, (Where T is understood from the context we shall refer simply 
to preference profiles,) For A' c A, RIA' is that element of R(A')
T 
whose tth coordinate is R(t)IA'' Given a T-profile R and a subset 
S c T, define the partial order ITS(R) on A via 
s " xIT (R)y <=> S c {t E T:xR(t)y}. 
ITS is then just the weak Pareto ranking for group S. When the profile 
is clear from the context we may write ITS for ITS(R), ITT may also be 
denoted simply by IT. 
When the set of alternatives A has a product structure, 
that is Ac ITAt, it is natural to introduce the notion of selfishness. T 
A T-profile R is selfish if 
w(t) & y(t) z(t)] => [xR(t)y <=> wR(t)z].
That is, th R(t) depends only on the t projection, nt' of A. In this 
case R(t) induces a regular preference, denoted R*(t), on nt(A).
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It should be noted that selfishness is a property of profiles, not 
of orders on the individual factors. A selfish profile can be 
constructed from orders on each of the· factors as follows. For each 
t, let Rt be a preference order on 
A
t. Define R E R(IT
A )T via
T t 
xR(t)y <=> 
Then R is a selfish profile on TIA and R*(t) = Rt. T t 
For a society T with the set A of social alternatives, a 
social welfare function (SWF) with domain V c R(A)T is a mapping 
�:V + R(A). When there is no possibility of confusion �(R) will be 
denoted R. (�(R') will be denoted R', etc.) 
An SWF � is said to satisfy the Weak Pareto Principle (WP) 
if and only if 
V x,yEA VREV[xIT(R)y => x$(R)y]. 
An SWF � is said to satisfy the condition of Independence 
of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) if a�d only if 
that 
R'I{ } => �(R)i{ } x,y x,y �(RI) I { } ] . x,y 
An ultrafilter on T is a collection U of subsets of T such 
a) 6 ¢ U & T E U. 
b) s E u & s' E u => sns' E u.
c) VS S E U or S
c E U. 
CT 
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From the above follows trivally that exactly one of S and Sc belongs 
to U, and that if S' J S E U, then S' E U. An ultrafilter U such that 
n s = 6 is called free. If n s = {t}' then u is fixed or principal. 
SEU SEU 
Every ultrafilter on a finite set T is fixed. If T is infinte there 
exist free ultrafilters on T. Every ultrafilter is either free or fixed. 
Every free ultrafilter contains no finite set. If U is an ultrafilter 
on T and T is partitioned into a finite collection of disjoint sets, 
exactly one of the sets belongs to U. 
The following definitions will be useful in discussing SWFs 
in an economic context. 
i 
Let Qi= {I; ElR :l;i > O, i = l,. .
• ,i}. The i will be
suppressed when it is understood from the context. 
Define the partial order > on Q by I;> n .<=> s-TjErl. 
Also, write n < I; for I; > n. A preference R on Q is weakly monotonic 
if s > n => i;R.n . 
For x,y EQT write F>(x,y) if 
VtETJi,jE{l, • • •  ,i}x(t)i > y(t)i & x(t)j < y(t)j. 
For real numbers a,S define a AS= min{a,S} and a V S  
maxfo,S}. For i-vectors define I; A n= (1;1 An1, . .. ,l;i
Ani) and 
i; v n = Cs1 vn1, .. . ,  si vn2). 
The set of positive commodity distributions for a society 
T T is just Q2, where 2 is the number of commodities. It is convenient
to introduce, for each S c T, the following partial order on QT: 
x > y <=> [VtESx(t) > y(t) & Vt x(t) < y(t)]. s ESc 
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Note that x >s y <=> y > x, and that > has no maximal or minimal elements SC S 
on QT, 
For the theorem to be stated below we will use two conditions 
on the domain of the social welfare function, which guarantee that it 
is sufficiently rich. The conditions are not restrictive and are 
satisfied by any class of "classical" profiles. Indeed they are satisfied 
by the class of profiles whose induced preferences can be represented 
by utilities of the form x + Eaixi + AEailnxi' Utilities of this form 
are strictly concave, c®, homothetic, strictly monotonic, and have in-
difference surfaces with nonvanishing Gaussian curvature which do not 
intersect the coordinate axes. These conditions will be satisfied by 
any larger class of preferences, so any reasonable definition of a 
"classical" set of profiles will satisfy the conditions. 
T A domain V c R(Q ) of profiles is said to be complete if for
every pair x,y with F>(x,y) and z with F>(z,y) & z� x there is a profile 
with z and y ranked arbitrarily and y preferred to x by S and vice versa 
by Sc. (See Figure 1.) Formally the condition is
Vx,y,z T VREV VQ T VScT [z > x  & F>(z,y) & En ER{x,y} s 
s sc yII (R)x & xII (R)y] => 3REV R'l {y,z} Q & R'l {x,y} 
Rj {x,y} • 
V is said to admit nonindif f erence if given any profile and pair of 
alternatives x,y there is a third alternative not indifferent to the 
first two and >- free with respect to each and which lies between x 
and y for those individuals with x preferred to y. (See Figure 2.) 
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Formally, the condition is 
Theorem. 
Vx y VR v3R' V3x' TF>(x',x)
 & F>(x' ,y) & ' EQT E E EQ 
VtET
(--x'R'(t)y & �x'R'(t)x) & R i {x,y} = R i {x,y} & 
{t:xR(t)y} � {t:xR'(t)y}. 
T T  T A Let V c R(nt) , t .:_ 2, and let �:V + R(nt) s
atisfy II • 
Suppose that V satisfies the following: 
(i) VREV R is selfish.
(ii) VR�V VtET R*(t) is weakly monotonic.
Suppose further that 
(iii) � is weakly non-imposed, i.e. , 
F>(x,y) => [3R
,R�V x�(R)y & y�(R')x]
. 
(iv) V is complete. 
(v) V admits nonindifference. 
Then either 
or 
or 
Remark. 
a) Vx,y T VREV x�(R)y, EQ 
b) {S:xIISy => x$y} is an ultrafilter, 
c) {S:xIISy => y$x} is an ultrafilter. 
The condition of weak non-imposition cannot be reasonably 
d f if > for some s there is extended to apply to all x an Y or x s Y 
only one profile on {x,y} which is admissible. 
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For T finite (b) implies that there is a dictator and (c) 
implies that there is an antidictator. 
The requirement that t � 2 is essential. If there is 
only one commodity then there is only one profile and both IIA 
and condition (iii) are vacuous. Any arbitrary social ordering 
is permissible. The fact that we take fl
T and not QT (where fl 
is the closure in lRt of fl) as the set of alternatives is significant. 
The conclusion fails to hold if fl is replaced by IT as the following 
example (due to Blau) shows. 
Let there be two individuals, T = {1,2}, and 2 � 2 
commodities. Let V c R(Q 2) 2 be a set of selfish profiles of 
weakly monotonic preferences. Let A1 = {x E IT 2 :x(l) = 0 & x(2) f 0},
and A2 = {x E ri2:x(l) f 0 & x(2) = O}, A1•2 {x E ri2;x(l) = 0 & 
x(2) = O}, and At/i = {x E ri2:x(l) f 0 & x(2) f O}. 
Define the SWF � by 
�(R) ,
Aq, 
= R(l) ,
Aq, 
�(R) IA1 = R(2) IA1 
�(R) IA2 = R(l) IA1 
F h A"' A Al A A2 A Al,2 f 11 f'l urt ermore � � � or a pro i es. No individual is 
a dictator for � as the first individual always ranks A1 below A2 
for every weakly monotonic preference, and as long as R(l) I
A
t/i f
R(2) /
Aq, 
the second individual cannot be a dictator. On the other 
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hand this social welfare function is easily seen to satisfy both the 
Pareto principle and IIA. 
The failure of an analogous theorem here is due to the 
fact that for any selfish profile of monotonic preferences, if x(t) 
then x is R(t)-minimal. Since x is R(t)-minimal, it cannot be 
weakly Pareto superior to any alternative. Thus WP has little to say 
about such alternatives. With minor strengthening of the monotonicity 
condition fl can be· replaced by Q\{O}. See Border [3] for further 
details. 
Proof of Theorem 
-
Lemma 1. Suppose x > y & xRy; then x > z => xRz and 
$ 13 -
z � y => zRy. 
Proof, First note that since x � y, weak monotonicity, 
selfishness, and IIA imply �(R)/ {x,y} is independent of R, so it 
makes sense to write xRy, 
Now suppose x�w and F>(y,w). By (iii) there are R and 
R' such that y�(R)w and w�(R')y. Thus, x�(R)w & w�(R')x, but 
since x � w, � j {x, y} is independent of R. Thus xRw. 
Next we show that we can choose w so that F>(w,z) & 
Given such a w, applying the above argument first 
to y and w and then to w and z yields xRz, as desired. 
To choose such a w, for each t E S choose z(t\ \ly(t)1 < 
w(t)1 < x(t)1 and 
0 < w(t)2 < z(t)2 
A y(t)2. For t E S
c choose 
0 
z(t\ Vy(t\ « w(t\ and x(t)2 < w(t)2 < z(t)2 A y(t)2• (See Figure 3). 
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The conclusion that z � y => zRy follows from the first 
conclusion by replacing � by �· 
s 
Lemma 2. Suppose x � y and xRy. Then R extends >. s 
qed 
Proof. Suppose w � z. We will show that below that we can 
choose x' ,y' so that x' �y, x' � y' and w�y'. Then by Lemma 1 
x'Ry since x' � y and x � y & xRy. Also by Lemma 1 x'Ry' since 
x' � y' and x' � y & x'Ry. Again by Lemma 1 wRy' since w � y' and 
x' �y' & x'Ry'. Lastly by Lemma 1 wRz since w�z and w�y' & 
wRy'. Thus we have shown that w > z => wRz, so R extends >. s s 
To construct x',y' as desired, for t E S  choose 
y'(t) < y(t) A w(t) and for t E Sc choose y'(t) > w(t). For t E Sc 
choose x'(t) < y(t) A w(t) and for t E S choose x'(t) > y(t). 
(See Figure 4). 
Lemma 3. Suppose x > y and xRy. .s 
qed 
Then Vw,z T VREV w�(R)z, Ell 
i. e. , the social welfare function is null. 
Proof, It follows from Lemma 2 that R extends >, Chooses 
u so that u > z and u > w. s s (This can be done as � has no maximal 
elements in QT, )  Then uRz & uRw, thus zRw. 
Lemma 4. Suppose x > y and xfty. Then x > z => xRz and s s 
z � y => z:Ry. 
qed 
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Proof. Let x� z. Suppose first that F>(y,z). Then by
(iii) there is REV such that y�(R)z. Suppose that zRx. (Since 
x � z this is well-defined. ) Then since xRy we have zRy, which 
contradicts y�(R)z. Thus xRz. 
Next suppose that there is w with x � w & F> (w ,z) & 
F>(w,y). Then applying the above argument first to w and y and
then to w and z, we conclude xRz, as desired. Such a w  is chosen 
as in Lemma 1. That z � y => zRy follows by replacing S by S
c. qed 
A 
Lemma 5 .  Suppose x � y & xRy. Then R extends >,s 
Proof. The proof of this is the same as Lemma 2 replacing 
R by R and references to Lemma 1 by Lemma 4. qed 
> 
sUs' 
Then x � z, 
xRz & zRy. 
A 
Lemma 6 .  If R extends > and ; .. then R extends > s 
Proof. First choose x, y, z such that 
for t 
for t 
for t 
for t 
E 
E 
E 
E 
s\s' 
sns• 
S 1\.S 
(SUS I ) c 
z;;,y and x > y. 
slls 1 
Since 
y(t) > x(t) > z(t) 
x(t) > z(t) > y(t) 
z(t) > y(t) > x(t) 
y(t) > z(t) > x(t), 
F. extends > and ;; ..s 
Therefore xR.y. Then by Lemma 5 R extends 
sns I 
we have 
> 
slls 1 
and 
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Next choose x, y, z such that 
for t E S '\S 
for t E (SlJS') c 
for t E (S\S') 
for t E ( sns ') 
y(t) > x(t) > z{t) 
x(t) > z(t) > y(t) 
z(t) > y(t) > x(t) 
y(t) > z(t) > x(t). 
Then x >cz, x > y, and x > cy .  Since R extends � and ii'•, we s s'c (sUs') 
zRx and y Rz so yRx. But x > y so y > x and since yRx, by 
(sUs')c sUs 1 
Lemma 5 we have R extends > • 
sUs' 
Lemma 1. Under the hypotheses of the theorem, either 
or 
or 
b) {S:R extends >} is an ultrafilter s 
c) {S:R extends > } is an ultrafilter. 
Sc 
Proof. Given x,y with x � y for some S, exactly one of 
three possibilities can occur: xRy, xRy, or yRx. If the first of 
these occurs then Lemma 3 implies that a) holds. If one of the 
other two possibilities occurs, then S {S:R extends >} must s 
contain any given set or its complement. Lemma 6 says that S is 
closed under finite unions and intersections, so that if T E S, 
then b) holds and if � E S then c) holds. 
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qed 
Lemma 8. Suppose S = {S:R extends �} is an ultrafilter. 
s ,.. s Then for S ES, xIT (R)y => y�(R)x, i. e. , S is antidecisive. 
Proof. Suppose that for some S ES we have xITS(R)y 
and that x�(R)y. Consider first the case where F>(x,y) and
VtET � xR(t)y. Put S' = 
{t:yR(t)x}. Since xilsy we haves c· s'c, 
so S 1 c E S , hence R extends >1 • Ch h h s oose z sue t at zi,x & 
F>(z,y). (This can be done since F>(x,y). See Figure 5). Since � 
is weakly nonimposed there exists R' E V such that y�(R')z. Since 
V is complete there is a profile R" E V such that 
R'·' I {y,z} 
Thus by IIA we have 
R' I & R" I = R I {y,z} {x,y} {x,y}' 
x�(R")n(R")z. 
But zi,x, so this contradicts the fact that R extends i•· Thus 
y�(R)x. 
The general case, where it is not necessarily true that 
F>(x,y) or VtET � x�(t)y, can be reduced to the previous case. Since 
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V admits nonindifference there exists x' s.t. F>(x,x') & F>(y,x') &
VtET(�x'R(t)x & �x'R(t)y) & xIT
S(R)x'ITS(R)y. Then from the previous 
case y$(R)x'$(R)x. qed 
Lemma 9. Suppose S {S:R extends >} is an ultrafilter. 
s 
Then for S E S 
xITS(R)y => x$(R)y, 
i. e. , S is decisive. 
Proof. The proof is virtually identical to that of Lemma 
8. qed 
The Theorem follows immediately from Lemmas 7, 8, and 9.
QED 
The Pareto Principle 
By requiring in addition to the hypotheses of the theorem 
that the social welfare function also satisfy the weak Pareto 
principle, we rule out possibilities (a) and (c) of the theorem. 
(Just consider x > y. Then monotonicity and the Pareto principle 
T 
imply xRy. This means that the social welfare function is not null 
and that {s: R extends > } is not an ultrafilter since it does 
sC 
not contain T. ) Thus for finite societies the social welfare 
function must be dictatorial, even for classical economic domains. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. A regular preference on A is a binary relation R on A which 
2. 
is total (Vw,yEAx 1 y => [xRy or yRx]), reflexive (VxEAxRx), 
and transitive (Vx,y,zEA[xRy & yRz] => xRz). The terms 
preference ordering or preference ranking or preference relation 
or simply ordering or ranking will sometimes be used.
R is defined by xRy <=> xRy & � yRx. R is defined by 
xRy· <�-> xRy & yRx. If R is regular then R is irreflexive 
(VxxEA � xRx), asymmetric (Vx,yEAxRy => � yRx), and 
transitive. R is symmetric (Vx,yEAxRy => yRx), reflexive, 
and transitive. 
3. R*(t) is defined by
n & xR(t)y. 
If R is selfish then R*(t) is well-defined and regular on nt(
A).
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